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Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies
(GURTs) in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Limits of
Technological Alternatives to Intellectual Property 
Chidi Oguamanam †
seeds to fundamentally alter their self-reproducing char-Introduction 
acter, or to induce trait susceptibility, selection or sup-
pression. Since the first patent for this technology was major challenge to sustaining exponential advances
granted in the United States in March 1998,5 terminatorA in biotechnology and digital technology in the last
technology has been perceived in the broader context ofcouple of decades has been the need for a suitable pro-
genetic modification in food and agricultural materials.tection and appropriation regime for these technologies.
Oppositions to the technology are staked on that inclu-While the malleability of intellectual property rights con-
sive background and they encompass traditional objec-tinues to be stretched to accommodate novel advances
tions to genetic modification and attendant privatizationin both digital and biological technologies, indications
of life forms. In a nutshell, the grounds of objectionare that other proprietary options are increasingly
include ethical concerns about a technology that is ori-becoming attractive to stakeholders in these technolo-
ented toward seed sterility and trait manipulation, thegies. 1  The limits of traditional intellectual property
general environmental or ecological impacts of termi-rights and, perhaps more so, the natures of the two tech-
nator varieties, as well as long and short term effect ofnologies have forced stakeholders to explore alternative
terminator varieties on biological diversity and publicprotective regimes. The need for a tighter proprietary
health. 6framework to support digital and biotechnology
endeavours stems mainly from the perception that valu- Other sources of reservation include the nature of
able information or inventions in the two areas are par- interaction of terminator varieties with other crops and
ticularly expensive to generate and effortlessly inexpen- the potential of the varieties to induce sterility on non-
sive to reproduce. 2 terminator or non-transgenic varieties through the phe-
nomenon of ‘‘gene wandering’’. Also, there is unease overWith regard to genetic modification in plant mater-
the potential impact of terminator technology in regardials or agricultural biotechnology in general, the inher-
to displacement of traditional agricultural practices ofently self-reproducing nature of transgenic or genetically
indigenous, rural and smallholder farming communities,modified materials, particularly seeds, makes it rather
such as seed-exchange and the component cultures oftasking for traditional intellectual property rights to effi-
seeding. 7 Equally, a considerable source of worry is theciently protect the proprietary interests of inventors and
suggestion that if the six big Northern based global mul-investors alike. This article evaluates the progression of
tinational life sciences corporations8 that now capitalizeknowledge protection in agricultural biotechnology
on the convergence of crop biotechnology withthrough traditional intellectual property rights, its sui
agrochemical and seed production were to adopt termi-generis versions, legislative interventions, and contractual
nator technology, it would accentuate the North–Southdevices to the contemporary epoch of a molecular or
asymmetry in agriculture and food production to antechnology-driven intellectual property alternative exem-
unprecedented level. Such an oligopoly would grosslyplified in genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs),
limit farmers’ choice in terms of crop varieties, trait selec-more commonly known as terminator technology. 3
tions, local adaptation of materials, etc. 9 thus raising con-Terminator technology is a very recent and
cerns about paucity of agro biodiversity and foodemerging phenomenon. It derives its nickname from
security, especially in the developing countries.Arnold Schwarzenegger’s science fiction movie of the
same name.4 Generally, terminator technology is a two- The foregoing concerns do not exhaustively articu-
prong biotechnological device for inducing sterility in late the reasons for the intense popular reservations over
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terminator technologies or GURTs and the phenom- technological substitute for intellectual property that sac-
enon of genetic modification. However, they are suffi- rifices the latter’s underlying public policy objective of
cient to establish the diverse grounds upon which such the promotion and dissemination of knowledge in the
objections are staked. In response to these concerns, con- public domain may be overkill in the hands of industry.
sideration of terminator technology has been incorpo- To the extent that terminator technology does not
rated into regulatory initiatives on the genetic modifica- account for the public domain consideration which is a
tion of living organisms at national and international material aspect of intellectual property, it may not be an
levels. 10 acceptable substitute. Even though they may fix per-
ceived institutional problems, by their nature, technolo-It is important to indicate that the technologies are gies alone do not address the public policy nuancesnot yet approved for commercial exploitation and avail- imbedded in conventional intellectual property jurispru-able knowledge about them is based on greenhouse and dence.laboratory experimentations. 11 Unlike other products of
In exploring the foregoing issues, this article isagro biotech, such as genetically modified food and
divided into three major parts. Part I evaluates the privatetransgenic plant materials, debates on health, biosafety
sector’s quest for profitable appropriability of returns onand other ramifications of terminator varieties are now
investments in agricultural biotechnology, withunderway at the United Nations Convention on Biolog-
emphasis on plant/seed breeding. It also explores theical Diversity (CBD)12 as a prelude to anticipated official
progressive response of intellectual property to accom-approval of the technologies for commercial exploita-
modate that desire. Part II focuses on the nature andtion. 13 In general, the emphases of popular global appre-
concept of GURTs as a self-enforcing technological imi-hension over genetic modification as a whole and termi-
tation of intellectual property and ongoing public policynator technology in particular are placed on ethical,
scrutiny of the technologies. It evaluates the terminatorhealth, biosafety and broader environmental questions.
initiative as akin to industries’ vote of no confidence onWhile focusing on these, general concerns about termi-
extant attempts by conventional and sui generis intellec-nator technology barely broach the policy implications
tual property regimes to accommodate their quest for aof the self-enforcing technological alternative to intellec-
tighter appropriatary and control regime. Part IIItual property rights which this technology portends. 14
broaches the public policy underlying the philosophy of
This article examines the adequacy of terminator intellectual property and evaluates the shortcoming of
technology as a potential substitute for traditional intel- terminator technology as a technological imitation intel-
lectual property. It acknowledges that the technology lectual property. The paper concludes by pointing to the
provides a stronger protection and reward mechanism need for direct inclusion of intellectual property consid-
than that offered by the traditional intellectual property erations in the ongoing discussions on the way forward
rights regime. However, terminator technology or any for GURTs. This paper, then, is meant to assist in cre-
other technology for that matter, is outside the pantheon ating a balance between the extant focus of those initia-
of intellectual property regimes. Fundamentally, termi- tives on environmental, biosafety, health and socio-eco-
nator is a technological answer to the quest by private nomic issues and a consideration of the intellectual
sector interests to improve appropriability of returns on property ramifications of GURTs.
investments in agrobiotech. It potentially represents a
panacea to the long standing industry struggle over the
profitability of private research in agrobiotech and the
Part I need to improve appropriability of returns on invest-
ments in self-pollinating plant varieties. Terminator tech-
nology constitutes a molecular or cellular proprietary PGR and Intellectual Property: The
control mechanism for plant genetic resources (PGR). Dynamics of the Pre-Terminator Era 
Consequently, terminator technologies are attractive
assets to private sector investors in agricultural research. Plant Breeding Regime and Other Sui GenerisHowever, the nature of terminator technology as ‘‘a tech- Response nological response to an institutional problem’’ 15 under-
mines a major policy plank of intellectual property istorically, farmers generated new plant varieties or
rights, namely, the preservation of knowledge in the H improved on existing ones through trans-genera-
public domain through time limit on protection and the tional and informal innovations with PGR. In such tradi-
requirement of compulsory disclosure. As a prospective tional settings, farmers chiefly relied on general observa-
molecular substitute for or imitation of intellectual prop- tions of ecological patterns in the ‘‘careful selection from
erty, terminator technology not only provides no known randomly occurring mutations in nature’’. 17  Varieties
agronomic benefit to farmers, 16 but also has the potential were deliberately selected first on the basis of their
to freeze up opportunities for knowledge transmission, adaptability to the vagaries of local ecological conditions
accretion, development and diffusion of technology in before consideration was given to their economic via-
transgenic crops. This article argues that any potential bility. Because of the informal and communal nature of
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traditional agricultural endeavours, appropriability of former’s conventional and sui generis formulations, and
new or improved genetic resources or novel plant vari- lately, in the technological imitation of intellectual prop-
eties was a matter of no serious concern. The incre- erty rights represented by the terminator.
mental nature of such informal innovations made it diffi- Increasing private sector participation in plantcult to identify when and from whom a new plant breeding in Europe, the United States and Canada,variety was introduced. 18 spurred a spate of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) legisla-
All this changed with the advent of formal scientific tion. As mentioned earlier, because of the historical
and entrepreneurial plant breeding some 125 years emphasis of conventional intellectual property, specifi-
ago. 19 Plant breeding became a target of organized scien- cally patents, on technical inventions and industrial
tific activity, a situation that raised concerns not only products and processes, it was not considered a suitable
about incentives for public sector research but also in appropriation regime for living materials in general and
regard to returns on private sector investments in the plant breeding in particular. 30 Indeed, the plant breeding
field. Unlike the traditional approach, scientific plant process is not easily expressed in the exact technical
breeding is essentially an exercise in deliberate incorpo- details required for the patenting of technical inven-
ration of specific or desired traits to create new or hybrid tions. 31 While early PVP legislation in European coun-
varieties using molecular techniques and other scientific tries dated from around the 1940s, 32 the United States
information. 20 From its evolution as early as the had a head start with the enactment of the Plant Patent
14th century, 21 intellectual property rights, specifically Act (PPA) of 193033 which aimed at granting special
patents, were limited to conferring exclusive rights to patent protection for innovations in asexually repro-
inventors of industrial or technical inventions. 22 Thus, ducing plants, especially for the horticultural industry.
historically, the paradigms of conventional intellectual That legislation provided the juridical framework for the
property as a mechanism for appropriation and control subsequent Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) of
of technical inventions did not extend to living materials 1970 34 which targeted sexually or non-asexually repro-
such as plants or plant varieties. 23 ducing plants. 35
With the formal scientific and private sector Despite the variegations in the details of various
entrepreneurial approach to plant breeding, the para- PVP laws in European States, the U.S. and Canada, essen-
digms of intellectual property rights extended to living tially, they confer rights on breeders (hence, plant
materials 24 through a rather dynamic trajectory that we breeders’ right or PBR) and impose limits on the rights of
will explore shortly. In regard to PGR, the self-repro- users or buyers of protected seed, in order to facilitate
ducing nature of seed, like the fluidity and easy replica- breeders’ profitable seed trade in proprietary varieties.
tion of information in digital technology, does not guar- However, given the divergences in national PVP laws,
antee effective control over the use of a proprietary plant distortions in the scope of rights of plant breeders across
variety that has been released to the farmer. According to national boundaries compelled the need for a uniform
Srinivasan and Thirtle, ‘‘[t]he vast discrepancy between transnational PVP regime. Premised on the national
the benefits that could be appropriated privately by the treatment principles, the 1961 International Convention
breeder and the total social benefits [inherent in the self- for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV)36 was
reproducing nature and agronomic value of seed] born to address this need. UPOV recognizes the impor-
implied that the market mechanism would fail to pro- tance of isolation, distinctness or identification of a
duce a socially desirable level of investment or effort in variety as its warrant for intellectual property protection.
plant breeding’’. 25 Attempts to mitigate this form of Under the UPOV, uniform criteria for protection of new
‘‘market failure’’ in both developed and developing plant varieties are limited to varieties possessing the fea-
countries by the provision of investment through public tures of novelty, 37 distinctiveness, uniformity and sta-
sector research in plant breeding, while partially suc- bility.
cessful, could not endure because of dwindling financial While facilitating breeders’ rights, includingsupport. 26 breeders’ exclusive commercial trade in propagating
Declining public sector investment in R & D in an materials or seeds of protected varieties, the UPOV as a
era of privatization, a progressive extension of intellectual sui generis IPRs regime is clearly distinct from conven-
property rights over living materials, and private sector- tional patents. Like other national PVP regimes, the Con-
driven exponential increase in the biotechnology 27 vention incorporates two exemptions to breeders’ exclu-
industry dictated that the issue of control or sive appropriation and control of a protected variety. 38
appropriability of investment in plant breeding and seed The first exemption grants farmers the privilege to use
production be tackled. In order to profitably ‘‘commodi- farm-saved seeds from protected varieties obtained from
tize’’ 28 seeds, it became necessary that ‘‘institutional breeders. Thus, breeders’ rights did not trump farmers’
[interventions or regulatory] barriers be placed on [deal- age-long traditional practices to save seeds even of a pro-
ings with] self-reproducing characteristics of seed . . .’’. 29 tected variety after harvest.39 The second exemption,
This imperative paved the way for the progressive evolu- referred to as research exemption, allows the use of pro-
tion of intellectual property rights on PGR in the tected varieties for research or experiment. Under this
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exemption, a subsequently resulting variety could be but also enabled them to sell farm-saved seeds to other
commercialized without the authorization of, or pay- farmers and persons.
ment of compensation to, the original holder of the Yet, because of the prevalence of brown-bagging, its
plant breeders’ right. The practical translation of this perceived impact on the profitability of seed companies’
exemption is that under the UPOV regime of 1978 plant operations reopened concerns about a tighter
breeders’ right did not include the right to genes as appropriability regime for propagating materials. Fol-
principal genetic materials of protected varieties. 40 lowing on the heels of encouraging judicial decisions
circumscribing farmers’ (also crop) and research exemp-The enactment of national PVP legislation in most
tions in the U.S. 53 and the 1991 revisions of the UPOV,developed countries and the subsequent coming into
in 1994, the U.S. amended the 1970 PVPA. The neweffect of a harmonized international PVP regime under
amendment prohibits farmers from selling farm-savedthe UPOV in 1961 did not have the desired impact of
seeds while it preserves their rights to save seeds for theboosting profitable private sector participation in plant
sole purpose of replanting their fields only. Similarly, thebreeding, or so it was perceived. Aside from the perenni-
research exemption has been circumscribed to ensureally self-reproducing nature of seeds that makes proprie-
that it does not cover non-experimental undertakings. 54tary control impossible, exemptions in those regimes on
the bases of farmers’ privilege and research are cited as
the glaring weaknesses of the PVP regime that scuttled
Contractual Response viable appropriation of returns from non-hybrid crops. 41
Despite paucity of data, available information, even A responsive and tighter PVP regime is at the
though limited in scope, indicate that PVP laws have not instance of individual governments and, in the case of
yielded private sector quest for profitability of breeding the UPOV, a collective initiative of mainly industrialized
non-hybrid crops.42 Essentially, because of these two countries of North America and their European counter-
exemptions, the PVP is perceived as to be deficient as an parts. 55 Private sector actors in agricultural biotechnology
incentive regime for protection of innovations in seed and seed production, in particular, have grown in power
breeding. and in the influence they wield in the corridors of power
in both their home base in the North and their outpostsNot surprisingly, the UPOV has been revised three
in the South. For the most part, they share in the credittimes since 1961. 43 The most radical of these revisions
of getting governments to address industry sponsoredwas the revision of the 1978 version in 1991. The latter is
urgency to improve the appropriability of returns ona major departure from the prior regime and an aggres-
investments in agricultural biotechnology and self-pol-sive attempt to plug its ‘‘leaky’’ provisions and perceived
linating or non-hybrid plant varieties in particular.indulgences to farmers. Under the 1991 UPOV,
breeders’ rights supersede farmers’ privilege and extend Indications are that these corporations are not
to all species and all circumstances for reproduction of resting on their oars. Despite strides in improved PVP
the seeds of protected varieties. Member states have the regimes, agrobiotech corporations have continued to
option to provide for a farmers’ exemption under adopt customized contractual arrangements and mar-
national law.44 It extends breeders’ rights to even har- keting strategies to ensure improved appropriability and
vested material, 45 or varieties ‘‘essentially derived’’ from a profitable returns on investments. As part of their mar-
protected one. 46 It increases the duration of rights to 20 keting strategy, seed corporations have, in the last two
years, 47 all in an attempt to bring PVP laws as close as decades, been involved in a spate of mergers and acquisi-
possible to the tighter utility patent regime. tions in an effort to consolidate both their service and
product delivery, and to secure tighter appropriation ofThese changes in UPOV have since been reflected
their intellectual properties. Commercial agricultural orin the national laws of a majority of its member states.
agrobiotech research, industrial seed and alliedFor instance, ‘‘in almost the whole of Europe, farmers’
agrochemical production now converge and concentrateprivilege no longer exist except in the case of small
under few corporate strongholds. 56 It is then possible forfarmers’’, 48 whereas all other farmers are required to pay
them to take on individual or boutique farmers whoseroyalties to PBR holders for the use of farm-saved seed
choices are limited in take-it-or-leave-it contractual agree-associated with a protected breed.49 In Canada, the 1990
ments.Plant Breeders’ Rights Act50 seems to have pre-empted
the 1991 UPOV revisions even though it provides for an For instance, by means of special purchase and
18-year duration of breeders’ right. The principal PVP other contracts57 with ‘‘terminator clauses’’, 58 farmers are
law in the United States on the protection of inventions restrained from dealing with the harvested crop of a
on sexually reproducing plant varieties is the 1970 protected variety otherwise than for sale or consumption
PVPA.51 Along the spirit of the earlier UPOV regime, the as food. Thus, it is possible and certainly legitimate for
PVPA allowed farmers’ sale of farm-saved seeds of a pro- seed corporations to resort to contractual devices in
tected variety. This popular practice, nationally referred order to undermine the little statutory window that
to in that country as ‘‘brown-bag’’ sales,52 not only allows farmers to use farm-saved seeds of a protected
secured seeds for farmers for the next planting season, variety in their own farms under PVP laws. Similarly, in
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this asymmetrical contractual paradigm, corporations which there is an existing patent. Essentially, patent pro-
also negotiate highly intrusive powers in order to mon- tects against production or manufacture or all other
itor or audit farmers’ compliance with these onerous forms of exploitation and use of a patented product or
agreements. Today, farmers’ fields, in the eyes of multina- process. 65 The law interprets the concept of ‘‘use’’ for the
tional seed corporations, also double as potential forensic purposes of patent infringement very liberally to the
laboratories of evidence against recalcitrant farmers. This advantage of a patent holder. 66 In the famous 2004 deci-
is so in the former’s quest to improve appropriation of sion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Monsanto
return on investment and to enforce compliance with Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 67 the Court observed
onerous contractual agreements. This, sometimes, that where a party employed a patented invention and
involves the use of private investigators or what has been thereby deprived the patent owner full or exclusive
termed ‘‘gene police’’. enjoyment of the patent monopoly, it does not matter
what the offending party intended, or that he did not
profit from the invention. Given its emphasis on
Developments on the Patent Regime preventing farmer profiteering at the expense of
breeders, it is not likely that the PVP regime we haveApart from improvements in PVP laws as a sui
reviewed could provide such an extensive protection to ageneris intellectual property option and special contracts,
right holder that utility patent does. Thus, empirically,efforts to improve appropriation and control of PGR are
the scope of protection of right holders under utilityevident in the progressive judicial re-conceptualization
patent trumps the rights of breeders under the PVPand expansion of the patent regime to the realm of living
regime.organisms. In retrospect, the original reluctance to
extend patent protection to living materials appears to
have been shortsighted as it is no longer sustainable. At Proprietary stakeholders in agrobiotech can now
present, only a few would fault the characterization of indulge in multiple protection options to secure the
that approach as one premised on obsolete jurispru- appropriability and control of their investments. To this
dence. end, the 1994 International Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 68 underIn a 1980 landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme
its controversial Article 27 provides, in part, thatCourt held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 59 that a non-
‘‘[m]embers may provide for the protection of plant vari-naturally occurring human-made genetically modified
eties either by [utility] patents or by effective sui generisbacterium designed to breakdown components of crude
system or combination thereof . . .’’. 69 It is important tooil was patentable subject matter under U.S. law.60 The
point out that today TRIPS represents the most compre-significance of that decision transcends its specific facts. It
hensive and arguably the most authoritative globallies, perhaps, in the Court’s recourse to the legislative
regime on intellectual property rights. As a componenthistory of the U.S. Patent Act in making a declaration
instrument of the Uruguay Round of General Agree-that when interpreting the Act, a liberal approach is
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its so called min-preferred. 61 Thus, according to Chief Justice Burger,
imum standards of intellectual property protection are‘‘Congress intended statutory [patent] subject matter to
applicable to all members of the World Trade Organiza-‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’’’. 62
tion (WTO) which administers the GATT. In regard toThus, creations of ‘‘human ingenuity’’, including non-
intellectual property, TRIPS is described as ‘‘the onlynaturally occurring living materials, constitute new,
game in town’’. 70 It has entrenched a concurrent protec-useful, ‘‘manufacture or composition of matter’’ under
tion of plant varieties by both patent and PVP.section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. As if to remove any
lingering doubts, in 1985, the U.S. Patent Board of
Appeals held that the existence of both the 1930 PPA Whether under various national PVP laws,
and the 1970 PVPA did not preclude the application of including their international consolidation under the
utility patents on new plant varieties. 63 The U.S.’s so UPOV, or various national intellectual property laws,
called liberal approach which has seen a patent issued including the global intellectual property regime under
for a genetically modified onco mouse is different from TRIPS, intellectual property rights are expensive and dif-
the Canadian approach which has denied patent protec- ficult to enforce. Despite the complexity and cost of
tion to the same concept. 64 procuring these legal proprietary devices, seeds are still
Conventional or utility patents are attractive to propagating materials. Thus, there is a limit to which
commercial breeders because they provide stronger pro- seed exchange and propagating materials on their own
tection and control. They are not subject to research and can be monitored even by the most aggressive right
crop or farmers’ exemptions which remain sticking holders whether as plant breeders or utility patentees or
points in the PVP regime. Unlike the case with PVP or both. Private sector pursuit of a cost efficient and water-
other intellectual property regimes, a patent right tight proprietary control mechanism for genetic mater-
excludes the claim of earlier or later inventors who inde- ials in agrobiotech remains an ongoing commitment.
pendently or contemporaneously invent the exact same That commitment takes a totally novel dimension in the
subject matter (in this case a new plant variety) over phenomenon of terminator technology.
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GURTs’ public relations deficit largely derives fromPart II 
V-GURTs, as the real ‘‘terminator ’’ technology.
Somehow, the unholy reputation of V-GURTs over-The Era of the Terminator 
shadows the promise of T-GURTs as agro biotech’s
potential marketing instrument of choice for service and
History and Nature of Terminator product delivery in a converging industrial environment.
By means of T-GURTs, seed and allied agrochemicalhree years after the coming into force of the TRIPS
corporations can market both proprietary seed varietyT Agreement in 1995, the United States Department
and component agrochemical inducers. In order toof Agriculture (USDA) and Delta & Pine Land Company
‘‘unlock’’ or activate value-added engineered traits in aastonished the world when, in 1998, they announced
proprietary seed, farmers will have to buy the relevantobtaining U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 titled ‘‘Patent for the
chemical inducer that targets specific genes responsibleControl of Plant Gene Expression’’. 71  That is the first
for activating desired traits. Thus, it is possible for a‘‘terminator’’ patent. Since that patent was obtained,
farmer to buy a seed with, for example, five potentialmany multinational agrochemical and seed corporations
value-added traits but who could only afford, or wouldhave continued to research into this novel biotechno-
only need three of those while leaving the rest latent. Inlogical phenomenon and to procure patents in genetic
this way, T-GURTs could enable seed companies toseed sterilization. 72 Essentially, terminator technology is a
practice price discrimination of a kind.75 The price of anew biotechnology or genetic engineering device to
seed may be tied to or mitigated by that of componentachieve suppression of true-to-type-second generation
agro chemicals required for activating its engineeredseeds or genetic copy propagation.
traits. A farmer pays and gets only what he/she hasFor the most part, this technology is industry’s
ordered and no more.weapon to prohibit unauthorized seed-saving of proprie-
tary seeds by farmers in order to maximize appropriation T-GURT seeds are capable of propagation beyond
of returns on agrobiotech investments in seed produc- the first generation because they are always fertile. How-
tion and effective marketing of component agrochemical ever, a farmer seeking to take advantage of the value-
inducers. As indicated in Part I, both utility patents and added traits in the next planting season would have to
PVP laws, apart from being expensive to procure and fall back on the seed company that has the intellectual
enforce, do not guarantee rights holders’ absolute control property over the agrochemical that unlocks or switches
and appropriation of their interests in PGR. Instead of the desired value-added traits. Thus, by means of T-
trusting farmers as users of proprietary varieties to GURTs, seed companies can take advantage of their
honour the intellectual property rights of breeders, crops intellectual property rights in agrochemicals in order to
are genetically modified to deprive them of the ability to keep the price of proprietary seeds low without compro-
germinate when replanted using terminator technology. mising their quest for maximum appropriability of
This vests crops with a self-enforcing capacity in regard returns on investments in agricultural biotechnology.
to breeder’s intellectual property rights. Unlike the PVP
A number of features distinguish V-GURTs from T-regime, terminator technology vests in the breeder abso-
GURTs. First, the latter are said to require few geneticlute control of plant gene and cell.
changes and are easier to be adapted into target plantsTerminator technology is, however, not all about and generally simpler to operate. 76 Second, T-GURTs doseed sterility. The technical description of the underlying not render sterile seed, since farmers can, subject to pre-technologies is ‘‘genetic use restriction technologies’’ (i.e., vailing PVP laws, replant T-GURT seeds in the nextGURTs). Loosely, there are two embedded principal planting season even though they would need to buybiotechnological devices in issue. The one incorporates external chemical inducers or the ‘‘key’’ from the seedvariety-genetic use restriction technologies (V-GURTs), company in order to take advantage of the engineeredand the other is trait-genetic use restriction technologies traits. Because T-GURT seeds are fertile, farmers can(T-GURTs) derogatorily called ‘‘traitor [gene] tech- reproduce them and not depend on seed companies fornology’’. Both of them involve deployment of external seed, a situation that may positively impact on the cost ofstimuli to manipulate expression of exogenous genes in seed. 77plants. 73 In V-GURTs, the expression of the exogenous
genes is designed for the sole purpose of inducing ste- The fact that T-GURTs do not render sterile seed
rility. It is this form of GURT that largely accounts for undercuts one of the key criticisms of the terminator
the intense public abhorrence of the technologies and concept. Credible opposition to terminator technologies,
thus constitutes the target of the technologies’ bad pub- particularly on ethical and socio-economic grounds, is
licity. This is the reason for the popular designation of anchored essentially on the phenomenon of seed ste-
GURTs as terminator technology. Quite unlike V- rility. The latter undermines the natural concept of seed
GURTs, in T-GURTs deployment of external stimulus is as a genetic copy propagation material, and has the
designed to activate the expression of genetically engi- potential to engender dependency of resource poor
neered or value-added traits without hampering seed farmers on seed corporations, the so called ‘‘gene giants’’.
viability. 74 That criticism does not have much bite when extended
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to T-GURTs as it does in regard to V-GURTs. However, tinued to pursue development of T-GURTs, which it
the potential tendency of T-GURTs to escalate chemical- considers a credible and viable alternative to V-GURTs.85
ization of agricultural production raises biosafety and
environmental concerns.
Regulatory Initiatives on GURTs Thirdly, it would appear that conceptually, T-
GURTs do not foreclose the operation of farmers’ or Concerns over terminator technology have not
crop and research exemptions in the various PVP laws, gone unheeded. As an aspect of genetic modification,86
the UPOV and under the Food and Agricultural Organi- the potential impact of terminator technology tends to
zation’s International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources constitute a flashpoint for wider international and
for Food and Agriculture (FAO/ITPGRFA). 78 However, national initiatives to regulate genetic modifications in
T-GURTs would seem to curtail the extent of farmers’ or food and agriculture. Broader regulatory initiatives on
crop and researchers’ exemption under these regimes. genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are not the sub-
This is so because a farmer’s right or researcher’s latitude ject of this paper and as such would not detain us here.
to deal with T-GURT varieties does not extend to the Keeping our focus on terminator technology, in 1998,
engineered traits which are, perhaps, their most impor- the Fourth Conference of Parties (COP), which is the
tant attraction. 79 Access to the traits is circumscribed by decision making organ of the CBD, requested the Con-
pre-existing intellectual property over proprietary chem- vention’s technical advisory body, the Subsidiary Body
ical inducers. on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice
(SBSTTA) to consider, assess and elaborate scientifically-Finally, unlike V-GURTs, T-GURTs do not portend based advice to the COP on ‘‘whether there are anyan interminable regime of appropriation. Patent rights consequences for the conservation and sustainable use ofover the component chemical inducers, i.e., so called biological diversity from the development and use of‘‘keys’’ that unlock engineered traits have, in most cases, a new technology for the control of plant gene expression20-year term. Consequently, at the expiration of the as described in U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765’’. 87 SBSTTA’spatent term, farmers would have uninhibited access report was premised on a background paper prepared byfrom the public domain to the know-how for making multi-disciplinary experts in relevant fields88 which hadthe agrochemical inducers. However, independently, the the benefit of input from diverse stakeholders after wideviability of these chemicals is not guaranteed. The use consultations. 89 Building upon the SBTTA initiative, 90 atrestriction, or terminator inducers are strictly bundled its 2000 meeting, the fifth COP, while resolving to con-with and customized to engineered traits in target crops tinue inquiry on GURTs, recommended as follows:otherwise these traits may not be available. 80 It would
[I]n the current absence of reliable data on genetic useperhaps require development of competing varieties
restriction technologies, without which there is an inade-from scratch in order to impeach or dilute pre-existing quate basis on which to assess their potential risks, and in
terminator processes. 81 accordance with the precautionary approach, products
incorporating such technologies should not be approved by
As a result of the bad publicity and credible and Parties for field testing until appropriate scientific data can
justify such testing, and for commercial use until appro-often well-founded concerns about terminator tech-
priate, authorized and strictly controlled scientific assess-nology, big seed corporations and other key agricultural
ments . . . 91bodies, notably, the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the Food and Agri- The CBD’s scrutiny adopts an integrated approach
cultural Organization (FAO) have shunned the tech- to GURTs as the latter are implicated under each of the
nology. 82 By now, terminator technology has become a Convention’s four elements of the program of work on
public relations disaster for seed multinationals, mainly agricultural biodiversity. 92 As a follow-up to the above
because of the aggressive public enlightenment cam- decision, two years later (2002), the sixth COP decided
paigns of NGOs, notably the Canada-based ETC Group to establish an ad hoc technical expert group (AHTEG)
and motley indigenous peoples’ and environmental and on GURTs to further analyze the potential impacts of
allied interest groups. By 1999, Monsanto made a volte- GURTs, this time, on small holder farmers, indigenous
face from its initial support for commercialization of and local communities and on farmers’ rights. 93 Mean-
terminator 83 and, with that, sacrificed its proposed while, the 2000 fifth COP had invited the FAO’s Com-
merger with cotton giant, Delta & Pine Land — a joint mission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
holder of a pioneer terminator patent. Yet, the seed (FAO/CGRFA) and other relevant organizations to take a
giants could not resist the temptation to keep scrambling convergent approach ‘‘to further study the potential
for terminator patents and warehousing them perhaps implications of genetic use restriction technologies for
for an opportune time. Since the first terminator patent the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural bio-
was issued in 1998 in the U.S., many more terminator logical diversity and range of agricultural production sys-
patents have been granted in that country and else- tems in different countries, and to identify policy ques-
where. 84 It is interesting to note however, that after dis- tions and socio-economic issues that may need to be
avowing terminator technology, Monsanto has con- addressed’’. 94
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At its seventh biannual meeting in Kuala Lumpur in deliberations. UPOV did not only make an elaborate
February 2004, the COP re-turned the 2003 AHTEG presentation, it also, in a rather controversial circum-
report on GURTs to SBSTTA, pursuant to the latter’s stance, submitted two memos to the CBD secretariat
advice requesting it to consider the report in order to articulating its position. 104 However, UPOV shied away
provide the CBD with technical advice on the way for- from seizing the momentum to open an elaborate dis-
ward in regard to GURTs.95 Also in the same forum, the cussion on the policy implications of GURTs as self-
FAO/CGRFA report on GURTs which was commis- enforcing technological intellectual property. Rather, it
sioned a year earlier than the AHTEG mandate, was adopted a self-serving approach and limited its participa-
submitted to the COP.96 In approaching its assignment, tion to highlighting key advantages of the UPOV PVP
the outcome of which will be presented at the eighth regime over GURTs. Compared to the UPOV PVP
COP in 2006, the SBSTTA is determined to take an model, GURTs, the UPOV position paper rightly con-
integrated approach to the two reports, given the dif- cluded, ‘‘may have considerable disadvantages for
ferent but the inter-related nature of their emphases97 society’’. 105 In essence, UPOV portrayed the potential
and, perhaps more importantly, because of the central introduction of GURTs as a punitive fate that awaits
role of SBSTTA in the evolving policy deliberations on recalcitrant farmers should they undermine the UPOV
GURTs. It is interesting to note that the AHTEG on plant breeder regime.106
GURTs recommended that the COP reaffirm its deci- Shortly after the AHTEG meeting, the U.S. dis-
sion to withhold commercial approval of the technolo- claimed the UPOV criticism of GURTs.107 Conse-
gies. 98 It also urged parties to the CBD ‘‘not to approve quently, UPOV withdrew it first memo and substituted
GURTs for field-testing and commercial use’’99 in light one that abandoned its original and informed criticism
of a continued paucity of data on GURTs and in accor- of GURTs. The result is that whilst technical and expert
dance with the precautionary principle. 100 opinions on potential environmental, biosafety, health,
Two issues arise from the ongoing attempt at agronomic and other impacts of GURTs are elaborated
devising a policy or regulatory framework for GURTs. in the two major ongoing CBD initiatives on GURTs,
First, as noted earlier, the focus of the approach is on intellectual property receives only peripheral treatment
GURTs’ impact on environmental, biosafety, ethical, and is not considered a key subject matter in the man-
health and food/seed security, including traditional agri- dates and terms of reference of both FAO/CGRFA and
cultural practices in rural economies. For instance, even the AHTEG and the first mandate of the SBSTTA.
though the 2000 COP mandate to the FAO/CGRFA The second issue is that through ongoing delibera-
requested the latter to work in collaboration with other tions, agrobiotech and multinational seed corporations
international agencies and research bodies, that has not are able to make the case that GURTs have additional
really struck a balance in the focus of the discussions benefits beyond the popular and yet undisputed belief
between environmental and safety concerns and other that they are technological control mechanisms for
considerations such as intellectual property rights.101 appropriation of investment returns on agricultural bio-
Similarly, the COP mandate to the AHTEG encouraged technology. Thus, no discussion of GURTs would be
it to take into account not only the FAO/CGRFA work complete without mention of the technologies’ less-
but that of other agencies, including the UPOV and talked-about potential benefits. Mention of just a few key
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s such benefits will suffice.
Inter-Governmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Perspectives on Potential Benefits of GURTs Folklore (IGC/IPGRTKF). 102 Even though the potential
intellectual property ramification of GURTs are high- On an ironic note, though major concerns about
lighted in both the FAO/CGRFA and the AHTEG as GURTs, like all GM crops, hinge on their indeterminate
well as in other expert reports, because of their man- potential long term environmental consequences,
dated focus on biosafety, health and socio-cultural, eco- GURTs, especially V-GURTs, constitute devices that aim
nomic and other considerations, no robust discussion at controlling unwanted escape of genetic material into
has been generated on the intellectual property question. the wild or the environment. Perceived as ‘‘efficient tech-
It must be admitted, however, that none of the nology for environmental containment of transgenic
bodies directly involved with the two reports on GURTs seed (V-GURTs) or transgene (T-GURTs)’’, 108 this charac-
is an intellectual property body. The reference to WIPO’s teristic of GURTs is said to be biotechnolgy’s solution to
IGC/IPGRTKF is only as a potential collaborative institu- the topical question of how to mitigate the liability of
tion whose interest in GURTs is perhaps perceived, proprietary rights holders for crop contamination, i.e.,
albeit erroneously, as peripheral. Neither WIPO nor the intruding transgenic species in the wild or in organic or
IGC was represented at the AHTEG deliberations; and even other transgenic farmer’s fields.109 However, as
the WIPO did not send a written memo.103 On the attractive as that seems, for open-pollinating species
contrary, UPOV which administers the international potential outcrossing of V-GURT varieties, or in the case
treaty on PVP or plant breeders’ right — a form of intel- of T-GURTs, of negative traits, through natural dispersal
lectual property right — was actively represented at the of excess pollens may have a counterproductive effect.
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This may result in spreading sterility or unwanted traits, In 2002, remnants of ProdiGene biopharm corn,
by horizontal gene-flow, into neighboring and wild rela- which is genetically engineered to produce protein used
tives. 110 Also, as part of their potential advantage, T- to manufacture a vaccine against swine diarrhea,
GURTs have the unique potential to enable farmers to sprouted amongst soybeans that were planted in the
time target the activation of a desirable trait, or withhold same field the subsequent year. Consequently, they pol-
the same, on the basis of the prevailing exigency at that luted crops meant for human consumption.116 Mean-
phase of plant or animal development. 111 Thus, even while, the polluted soybeans became intermixed with
though there is credibility in the claim that GURTs have other soybeans from other sources and required removal
potential environmental benefits by curtailing transgenic from the human food chain. In another incident,
pollution or gene wandering, such a claim is not abso- ProdiGene’s biopharm corn was suspected to have pol-
lute, especially in relation to open-pollinating as opposed luted normal corn planted for human consumption
to self-pollinating crops. 112 Overall, GURTs have poten- adjacent to the transgenic biopharm corn field. This
tial both as sources of environmental pollution as well as resulted in the destruction of 155 acres of corn fields. 117
for environmental containment or preservation. Similarly, StarLink corn which was engineered to pro-
duce a bacterial protein118 that creates Bacillus thur-
Similarly, like genetic modification practices in the ingiensis (Bt) insect resistance, was originally approved
agricultural sector, GURTs are perceived as biotechno- for animal feed. This was because of its known adverse
logical device with potentials to boost global food pro- and allergic effect on humans. But in 2000, the trans-
duction and supply. At face value, the phenomenon of genic corn created panic when food stuff associated with
seed sterility is antithetical to an increase in food produc- it found its way onto supermarket shelves in the U.S.. 119
tion because of its potential for crop contamination and With incidents of the pollution of non-transgenic crops
consequent inducement of yield drops in cultivated by transgenic breeds and accidental intermixing of
areas. However, given its potential to stimulate profitable biopharm crops with their counterparts meant for
plant breeding, GURTs are likely to result in an increase human consumption, 120 the potential relevance of
in food supply, 113 mainly by formal private sector GURTs in environmental containment as applied to the
farmers. At the same time, GURTs could circumscribe biopharmaceutical and medical research context
availability of new and useful propagating varieties to presents one of the possible benefits of the technologies.
local farming communities, and the scope of seed choice
open to traditional or rural farmers. Thus, one of the Lastly, GURTs represent a potential catalyst for
criticisms of GURTs evident in both the AHTEG and research and development (R & D) in agricultural bio-
the FAO/CGRFA reports is that GURTs potentially con- technology. 121 Again, like genetic engineering in food
centrate breeding efforts, with emphasis on value-added and agriculture, GURTs have the potential to enhance
crops, in the private sector. This comes at the expense knowledge about plant genomes and overall functional
natural agro biodiversity and agronomic enhancements understanding of plant and animal genetics and repro-
in traditional or informal farming practices.114 With ductive biology. 122 There are at least two perspectives to
regard to T-GURTs, they offer farmers a menu of value- the view that improving R & D in agricultural biotech-
enhancing traits that collectively operate to ensure effi- nology is one of the benefits of the GURTs. The first
cient crop production practices. Despite their capacity to derives from the nature of the technology and science of
induce seed sterility, the argument that GURTs have GURTs. Technologies, such as T-GURTs, for instance,
potential to increase food supply, albeit at some indeter- that have the potential to identify, explore and to func-
minate socio-economic and environmental costs, may be tionally control the immense genetic potentials in plants
hard to impeach. for targeted objectives, have the promise of pushing the
frontiers of agricultural biotechnology to an unprece-
As part of the broader process of genetic modifica- dented level. Perhaps there is no more direct evidence of
tion, GURTs might not only mitigate risks of potential this than in the continued research and application for
liability in the mismanagement of biomedical and phar- GURTs patents even though the technologies are yet to
maceutical research activities, they could also help be approved for commercial exploitation.
achieve some degree of precision and efficiency in such
activities. GURTs are exportable technologies of rele- The second perspective to the view that GURTs are
vance in biomedical and pharmaceutical research and in a potential boost to R & D in agricultural biotechnology
human and animal drug trials and in the phenomenon is anchored on the principal objective of the technolo-
of biopharming. 115 By means of lethal or sterile genes gies. We have previously identified this objective as the
and trait selection mechanisms, GURTs have potential need to ensure profitable appropriability of returns on
to control the use of transgenic materials against unin- investments and concentration of seed monopoly in
tended purposes in unintended environments and time. transnational seed corporations, a trend which critics
For instance, V-GURTs can potentially mitigate the describe as ‘‘biosafedom’’. 123 As a technological control
unwanted spread of gene-altered pharmaceutical crops strategy that plugs the ‘‘leaky’’ loopholes of the permis-
or other transgenic therapeutic and biomedical research sive PVP regime and other constraints of conventional
materials. intellectual property rights, GURTs are the potential
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armour that the industry appears to have been waiting way of intellectual property or not, results in increased
for to decisively win their running battle with farmers’ inventiveness. While the truth of this claim cannot be
rights to use farm-saved seeds. Capturing industry senti- easily dismissed, nonetheless, it is not absolute. 131 Innova-
ments, Pendleton argues that ‘‘[t]he combination of poor tions in biotechnology or other areas of human
legal protection for innovations in crops and easy appro- endeavour would continue to occur with or without the
priation of IP limits companies’ willingness to expend existence of appropriation mechanisms. A better view
significant amounts of capital required to develop would be that, whether in its conventional or an imita-
advanced crops’’. 124 According to him, in addition to tive technological form such as GURTs, intellectual
good ‘‘farmstead economics’’, improvement in global property is a useful incentive to enhance the commer-
food supply hinges for the most part on efficient and cialization of innovation more than it is a motivation for
cost-effective intellectual property which terminator inventiveness. 132
technology offers. 125 The contractarian doctrine of intellectual property
In their study, economists Srinivasan and Thirtle right supports a concept of notional contract between an
found that ‘‘[i]f terminator technology were to be applied innovator and the state. In exchange for the disclosure of
to self-pollinated crops, appropriability of returns would valuable information, the latter grants a creator or
increase dramatically and the level of research expendi- inventor of intellectual work an exclusive right of
tures could potentially go up to the level of hybrid crops, exploitation of the work for a fixed period after which
i.e., increase four times the current level’’. 126 Because of the work resides in the public domain. 133 While this
their unequivocal potential value, generally, the debate theory may be more apt in the realm of patents and PVP
over terminator technology now transcends an inquiry regimes, it applies with lesser persuasion to copyright
unto whether they could satisfy the ever-changing utility and trademarks, and does not have practical relevance to
tests in modern patent jurisprudence. 127 It needs evalu- trade secret. 134 Nonetheless, a fundamental strength of
ating how fit is a self-enforcing technological or molec- intellectual property rights which applies to virtually135
ular control alternative to intellectual property can be as all their divergent but inter-related theoretical justifica-
a substitute to conventional intellectual property. To tions, including the reward/incentive and contractual
what extent, if at all, can terminator technologies accom- accounts, is the recognition of residual domiciliation of,
modate the public policy considerations that underlie and access to, useful knowledge in the public domain.
conventional intellectual property rights? That is the cen- We will return to this point shortly.
tral consideration of Part III.
In addition to its uneven scope of application over
different regimes of intellectual property rights, one
other drawback of the contractarian model is that therePart III is no objective way of balancing the value of the
monopoly conferred on the inventor or rights holder.
GURTs: Public Policy Deficit of a Specifically, it is hard to ascertain whether the value of
Technological Alternative to Intellectual the monopoly is commensurate with society’s benefit in
Property a given invention. Similarly, it is not clear if the inventor
is short-changed by the traditional time limit of the
monopoly in comparison to the invention’s potentialIntellectual Property Theories and Public Domain
interminable residual value in the public domain. If any-Imperative 
thing, this goes to show that intellectual property tran-here are diverse and often overlapping theories of scends economic considerations and cannot be accu-T intellectual property rights. 128  However, all of them rately evaluated on that basis.share the consensus that intellectual property rights are
The above synopsis merely samples the controver-‘‘loose clusters of legal doctrines’’ 129 that supervise the
sial nature of theorizing intellectual property rights.allocation of rights over knowledge. 130 Since our major
Because each traditional theory of intellectual propertyfocus is not on intellectual property jurisprudence per se,
rights provides some accurate but not entirely absoluteelaboration of theories of intellectual property will not
degree of theoretical justification, there is no exclusive orburden this paper. It suffices to tap into two of the
unified theory of intellectual property rights. 136 This isleading theoretical perspectives on intellectual property
more so because the dynamism in the nature and evolu-relevant to our discussion on GURTs, namely, the incen-
tion of technology, knowledge and information, foists ontive/reward and contractarian theories of intellectual
intellectual property an equally dynamic and corre-property rights.
spondingly malleable character. Thus, if ever there is aThe general view that GURTs, as watertight tech-
characteristic common to all regimes of intellectualnologies or molecular control mechanisms, will boost
property rights, it is their instrumentalist character. 137R & D in agricultural biotechnology is premised on one
of the fundamental theories of intellectual property As a mechanism for allocation of rights over knowl-
rights. It stems from the notion that an appropriate edge, intellectual property serves the instrumental pur-
incentive or reward mechanism for innovation, be it by pose of mitigating and balancing often competing claims
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of both the knowledge generator and that of society in A few illustrations of conventional intellectual prop-
the use of knowledge. Conventional intellectual property erty rights’ public policy strategy to mitigate the tension
rights recognize the legitimacy of creators’ or inventors’ between private domain monopoly and public domain
claim to exclusive exploitation of their knowledge under consideration will now be helpful. We begin with copy-
the ‘‘just dessert’’ philosophy.138 Of equal concern to right. Like most regimes of intellectual property, copy-
intellectual property as a matter of policy endorsed by right imposes a fixed duration for a creator or author’s
statute, is the need to encourage creativity, inventiveness copyright in a protected work. Perhaps the copyright
and knowledge generation. regime’s respect for the diffusion of knowledge is more
pronounced during the life of a copyrighted work. ThisIn Feist Publication Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service is seen in the exemptions created on the basis of fairCompany, 139 speaking in relation to copyright, the U.S. dealing, which include research or private study, criti-Supreme Court observed that the ‘‘promotion of pro- cism or review, and news reporting.148 While courtsgress of science’’140 is the cardinal objective of copyright. struggle to interpret the scope of these exemptions andThis observation captures the jurisprudence of intellec- to balance the competing interests in the context of thetual property. Reiterating the same rationale, the Cana- complex nature of multiple claimants to rights in createddian Supreme Court has held recently, first in Théberge works, especially in the digital era, 149 these exemptionsand reaffirmed in both Desputeaux and CCH Canadian underscore the point that diffusion of knowledge is athat copyright law should aim at mitigating and bal- public policy imperative of intellectual property rights.ancing the competing interests in the encouragement
and dissemination of intellectual and creative works and Unlike copyright, the patent regime does not
creators’ desire for just rewards for their efforts. 141 extend generous exemptions. However, for the most
part, it upholds the policy of encouraging diffusion ofIn its historical evolution, patent has been associated knowledge by insisting on a meticulous process of dis-with well-reasoned public policy regarding the granting closure of protected inventions by way of patent specifi-of privileges on the basis of careful consideration and cation150 and by a strict enforcement of the fixed patentbalancing of interests. 142 Intellectual property is a mecha- term. It bears no stressing that the requirement of disclo-nism that, among other things, aims at promoting the sure and a fixed duration pave the way for a residualadvancement of, and access to knowledge in the arts, deposit of vital knowledge in the public domain so as toscience, technology and all fields of human ingenuity. facilitate development and diffusion of technology.151For instance, copyright encourages a concept of origi-
nality that enables authors to build upon the earlier Because of its territorial limits as a subject matter of
works of others. 143 Despite its emphasis on novelty, national law, patent law also serves other instrumental
patent law recognizes true inventors as those who stand objectives. For instance, ideally, a country can determine,
on the shoulders of others to make unique contributions from time to time, the scope or limits of patentable
that advance knowledge. 144 And since one of its main subject matter in order to ensure quicker diffusion of
missions is promoting the generation of knowledge, knowledge in areas of national socio-economic policy
intellectual property jurisprudence recognizes that no priority. 152 Furthermore, patent law serves a public policy
knowledge is generated in isolation.145 objective by being deliberately restricted in a manner to
protect ordre public or morality and to avoid commer-Intellectual property’s underlying jurisprudence is cial exploitation of other culturally sensitive and prejudi-not simply a matter of a monopoly economics of inven- cial endeavours. 153 In essence, intellectual property strivestion and creativity. The ability of inventors and creators to ensure the balancing of diverse policy considerations,of intellectual work to engage in sustainable generation including the need to reward creators of innovation onof knowledge is linked to a vibrant flow of knowledge in the one hand, and generation, diffusion and dissemina-the fountain of the public domain.146 Since no knowl- tion of knowledge in the public domain, on the other.edge is generated in isolation, a rich public domain is a
treasure haven and feeder artery that supplies the life- Finally, both national and international PVP
blood for intellectual creativity in the private domain. regimes under the UPOV, as sui generis forms of intel-
Thus, as part of its underlying public policy, intellectual lectual property rights, uphold the requirement of disclo-
property rights jurisprudence strives to balance the utili- sure and a fixed duration of rights for breeders. At its
tarian and economic arguments for private domain early phase, plant patents required the deposit of samples
monopoly and the need to increase the sphere of ‘‘public of a novel variety since conformity with technical
domain available for creative manipulations and expres- requirements of patent specification was then hard to
sion’’ 147 in order to fulfill the mission of knowledge pro- achieve in the plant breeding context. 154 In addition to
motion, diffusion and dissemination. To achieve this all disclosure and a definite duration of right, PVP, like
important balance, patent laws, for example, requires dis- copyright, provides two key exemptions, namely,
closure of valuable information in exchange for farmers’ or crop exemption which accommodates
imposing a fixed duration of monopoly for rights farmers’ traditional practice to use farm-saved seeds, and
holders. It also grants other specific statutory and research exemptions. Despite the progressive circum-
common law exemptions to monopoly rights. scription of the scope of these rights through the trans-
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formation in the PVP regime explored in Part I, preserva- potentially foreclosed because of the technologies’ one-
tion of some of the rights are indicative of the sided focus on breeders’ interests.
fundamental policy thrust of intellectual property rights
We have noted that before the advent of formalin regard to diffusion of knowledge and the protection of
scientific breeding, farmers’ agronomic innovations werethe public domain.
incremental in nature and arose as incidences of theirAs evident in Part I also, the two exemptions are the
informal dealings with PGR. The problem of appropria-‘‘leaky’’ windows that GURTs attempt to permanently
tion of returns to innovation hardly assumed a centreshut. Not only that GURTs could close the window of
stage. The public sector’s dominant involvement in theexemptions, the former also have the potential to under-
early stage of agricultural biotechnology and agro sciencemine the disclosure requirement and the fixed term of
research ensured that the situation remained undis-intellectual property rights and, with that, dispense with
turbed. The entrance of the private sector into formalkey public policy imperatives that underlie the jurispru-
scientific research in agriculture raised the critical issuedence and theory of intellectual property rights in favour
of appropriation of returns on investment, particularlyof one-sided monopoly economics of invention and cre-
upon the backdrop of declining public sector commit-ativity.
ment to such research. Even in that context, the invoca-
tion of traditional intellectual property regimes or their
sui generis options, such as PVP, was gradual in its exten-Intellectual Property, Local PGR Knowledge and
sion to the realm of living materials after historic reluc-GURTs 
tance. When it did, it recognized that by their nature andAs an aspect of its instrumentalism, intellectual
on the basis of history, PGR has fostered agronomicproperty is, historically, a malleable phenomenon. As we
progress and agro biodiversity through a public domainhave seen in Part I, the progressive re-conceptualization
regime of crop diffusion. Exemptions, such as farmers’of PVP law demonstrates the dynamism of intellectual
right to use farm-saved seeds, researchers’ experimenta-property rights through which it accommodates changes
tion, the need for disclosure of innovation and the lim-in knowledge and technology, socio-economic and other
ited terms of intellectual property, all helped to ensurepublic policy imperatives. The same is true of the exten-
some measure of diffusion of knowledge in plant bio-sion of the patent paradigm to living materials. As a
technology without necessarily compromising innova-technological imitation of intellectual property rights,
tors’ monopoly claims.GURTs do not have the traditional flexibility of intellec-
tual property rights the significance of which, in the PGR Before GURTs, or more appropriately without
context, is a hot button issue. Over the last three decades, GURTs, it can be argued that the prevailing approach to
there have been concerted efforts, especially through the diffusion of agricultural innovation is far more sensi-
various international environmental treaties, like the tive to the public domain than would be possible if
CBD, and organizations such as WIPO and the FAO, to GURTs were commercially approved. This is so despite
commence a preliminary dialogue on reconfiguring con- the progressive curtailing of the scope of farmers’ and
ventional intellectual property in response to what a researchers’ exemptions under the PVP regime, and their
writer has called its crisis of legitimacy. 155 This is a refer- complete absence in the utility patent framework.
ence to the inability of intellectual property to accom- Indeed GURTs have the potential to concentrate agricul-
modate informal local or indigenous knowledge forms. tural research in the private sector and to restrict diffu-
In the context of PGR, both the FAO/ITPGRFA156 sion of the resulting knowledge. As ‘‘a technology with
and the CBD157 realize that indigenous knowledge accu- no agronomic benefit to farmers’’, 160 GURTs underscore
mulated through multi-century trans-generational the limitations of a technology control mechanism and
labours of farmers in the development and preservation their inherent crisis of fitness as a potential substitute to
of plant varieties, provide the primary resources now intellectual property. GURTs do not account for the
being ‘‘improved’’ and appropriated by scientific corpo- underlying public policy consideration of intellectual
rate breeders. 158 In this regard, there is an ongoing property rights, namely, the balancing of the interests of
debate on how to ensure that indigenous knowledge is innovators and that of users or the public and perhaps
adequately accommodated, if not by conventional intel- more importantly, the need to encourage the promotion,
lectual property rights, by its sui generis or cross-cultural diffusion and dissemination of knowledge. Along these
formulations. 159 Perhaps more importantly, the re-con- sentiments, Pendleton avers that ‘‘[i]n contrast to the
ceptualization of intellectual property rights in response farmers of the 19th century and public breeding pro-
to the demand of local knowledge holders have grams of the 20th century, the 21st century agribusiness
entrenched the concept of equitable ‘‘benefit-sharing’’ for concern is less concerned with sharing discovery than
all stakeholders, especially in the development and use of with selling them’’. 161
PGR. Under GURTs, the ongoing debate to address the
crisis of legitimacy in the intellectual property system in GURTs are deficient in at least five public policy
order to, among other things, accommodate indigenous features of the intellectual property rights. First, unlike
or local knowledge forms and benefit-sharing in PGR is patents, GURTs are not limited by a fixed term. A sterile
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seed is an irrevocably suicidal breed that has no redemp- pletely undermined their public policy thrust in regard
tive agronomic value that could reside in the public to balancing the interests of innovators against the need
domain. Second, GURTs, again unlike patents, do not for the diffusion of knowledge and the protection of that
have a compulsory disclosure requirement and, as such, knowledge in the public domain.
create no notional contractual obligation on the breeder. The advent of terminator technology is the latestThird, GURTs, unlike PVP, do not have farmers’ and attempt by industry to seek a tighter appropriationresearchers’ exemptions and are not susceptible to other model that has the potential to shut out the publicinstrumental public policy interventions common to policy concessions and exemptions that are available totraditional intellectual property rights. Fourth, GURTs farmers and users of PGR under intellectual propertydo not have a mechanism for balancing the competing rights. Despite their potential to stem the tide of geneinterests of innovators and users of protected varieties wandering, essentially, GURTs are self-enforcing cellularand the public domain at large. Fifth, GURTs do not or molecular technological alternatives to, or imitationsaccount for benefit-sharing or for the potential to accom- of, conventional intellectual property protection mecha-modate informal farmers’ or indigenous contribution to nisms. As a techno-fix to seed industry’s institutionalimprovements in PGR. problem, GURTs have the attractions of intellectual
As self-enforcing technological device, GURTs property. However, they are deficient in terms of the
represent an efficient imitation of intellectual property, underlying public policy: the technologies mainly
especially the patent regime. Because of its tight use address the needs of the seed industries at the expense of
restriction focus or framework, 162 it does not factor in farmers and other users of PGR, and generally disregard
the underlying public domain orientation of intellectual the diffusion of agronomic innovation knowledge. Tech-
property jurisprudence. Thus, it has all the attractions of nological devices, no matter how ingenious, cannot fit
intellectual property, especially the patent regime, while within the pantheon of conventional intellectual prop-
it portends to confer only a fraction of its benefits to only erty rights.
a portion of stakeholders. 163 Even though the compo-
Like its precursor in crop hybridization,165 econo-nent technologies underlying GURTs may be the sub-
mists are wont to argue that the potential success ofject of patents and/or PVP, their relevance lie in facili-
GURTs may be a matter for market forces to deter-tating the primary purpose of promoting sterility and
mine. 166 However, the public policy thrust of intellectualrestriction of the use of protected traits, thereby circum-
property rights regarding diffusion of knowledge in thescribing the two major points of diffusion of knowledge
public domain, transcends interests that propel and jus-and the promotion of crop potential agronomic benefits.
tify economic and market forces arguments. Indeed, theGURTs potentially limit farmers’ dealing with PGR to
long term consequences of a device that has no, or, atgrowing and selling of commodity grains164 for con-
best doubtful agronomic benefit may never be known orsumption or other uses. In the specific case of V-GURTs,
measured in strict economic terms. As such, the publicfarmer’s dealing with seed is circumscribed by the
policy that underlies intellectual property philosophy isbreeders’ remote control of value-added traits. In effect,
one which technology alone is incapable of meeting. InGURTs are potential threat to farmers’ traditional
the context of PGR, GURTs undermine all existing con-sources of agronomic innovation.
cessions inherent or provided under the regime of intel-
lectual property and its promise in terms of equitable
benefit sharing of PGR and accommodation of indige-
nous knowledge in the direction of a cross-cultural dia-Conclusion 
logue on intellectual property rights. 167he exponential progress made in agricultural bio-T technology in the last couple of decades and the Current public policy scrutiny of GURTs, as cham-
decline of public financing of agricultural research have pioned by the CBD, has continued to emphasize envi-
yielded the entrenchment of the private sector in agricul- ronmental, biosafety and socio-economic concerns.
tural biotechnology research and exploitation. This state Although intellectual property has been implicated and
of affairs has heightened the pressure from industry incorporated in the ongoing initiatives, there is no con-
stakeholders for a profitable appropriation of return on crete, focused or institutional attempt to explore the
investments in agricultural biotechnology, especially implication of the attempt by this technology to usurp or
seed production. Through progressive refinements, intel- undermine conventional intellectual property regime. In
lectual property rights, both in their conventional and order to have a balanced and informed policy on
sui generis formulations, have extended their paradigms GURTs in the unfolding conversation, the present
to living materials after a historic reluctance. Also, they emphasis on environmental, health, safety and socio-eco-
have attempted to circumscribe, or more appropriately, nomic concerns must be balanced with a more elaborate
to regulate farmers’ exploitation of the propagating consideration of intellectual property. Without doubt, a
nature of seeds so as to accommodate plant breeders’ stronger involvement by WIPO and other relevant intel-
claim for reward for their investments. In these lectual property organizations is imperative in the
endeavours, intellectual property rights have not com- ongoing scrutiny of GURTs.
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